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I. INTRODUCTION
{1}After the Recording Industry Association of America's ("RIAA") attack on the Diamond Rio proved
unsuccessful, the music industry turned its attention to the companies enabling reproduction of copyrighted
music. (1) Two important cases appeared after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that Diamond Rio was not infringing on copyrights. These cases, A&M Records, Inc. et al. v. Napster, Inc. (2)
and UMG, Inc., et. al. v. MP3.com, Inc., will shape computer technology's effect on American copyright law.
(3)
{2}This update will discuss these two cases and give brief overviews of the courts' findings and conclusions.
These findings will be compared to the ruling in Diamond, and any possible impacts on that decision will be
highlighted. In closing, this update will explore some possible theories of resolving this very real conflict
between the music industry and the free dissemination of copyrighted materials over the Internet.
II. NAPSTER
{3}On December 6, 1999, A&M Records, Inc., joined by several other recording companies brought suit
against Napster, Inc. for contributory and vicarious federal copyright infringement under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). (4) Napster provides software that allows its members to trade and
share music files on the Internet. (5) Although Napster started as a program to facilitate the exchange of
music between its designer and his college roommate, it has grown into a company used by millions. (6)
Although Napster currently does not receive funds for its services, company projections indicate they have
plans for expanding the amount of music available and profiting from targeted e-mail, advertising, and
marketing of CDs and Napster products. (7)
A. Napster's Motion for Summary Adjudication
{4}Napster quickly took the offensive and moved for summary adjudication in their dispute with the music
industry. (8) The court explored the process followed by Napster users. The process begins by downloading
Napster's MusicShare software. This software allows a user to automatically connect to one of Napster's
numerous servers every time he logs on. Next, the software reads the names of MP3 files on the user's hard
drive that the user chooses to make available and adds them to its directory of files available to Napster
consumers. The user can also receive files from this directory by preforming a search, locating a file of
interest and downloading the file. (9) In addition, Napster allows users to play the downloaded music and
provides a chatroom in which users can interact.
{5}The court looked to Section 512 of the DMCA, which governs the liability of Internet access providers
and online services for copyright infringement. (10) Napster argued that their activities did not constitute
copyright infringement under the DMCA. (11) They claimed safe harbor as a "service provider" under
Section 512(a), which limits liability of Internet services that transmit, route, or provide connections for
material that travels or is temporarily stored in the service when the following five conditions are met: (12)
(1) An individual, other than the service provider, initiated or directed the transmission of the material
at issue;
(2) The Internet service provider did not select the material being transferred, routed, or stored, but
instead the process is completed automatically;
(3) Another person, not the service provider, selects the recipient of the material;
(4) The material housed on the server is not available to individuals other than the named recipient, nor
is it available to the intended recipient for an unreasonably long period of time; and
(5) The Internet service provider does not alter or modify the material's content. (13)
{6}Napster argued they were not infringing copyrighted music, but were simply providing a forum in which
users could share music. Napster supported their argument for safe harbor by emphasizing that it never
initiates the transfer of music over the Internet; transfers are always initiated by its users. (14) Next, Napster
noted that the transmission of music files through their service occurs automatically and that they do not alter,
or modify files. Napster also argued that they do not choose the recipients of the transferred files. Finally, the
Internet company stressed that at no time during the transfer process are files copied. For these reasons,
Napster contended they were protected from copyright infringement liability under section 512(a). (15)
{7}The plaintiffs disagreed with Napster's depiction of their Internet service, and believed that Napster was
not protected by the DMCA's safe harbor provision. The plaintiffs instead viewed Napster as a facilitator of
Internet copyright infringement. The plaintiffs supported their argument by claiming each of Napster's
functions must be assessed independently under section 512(n) before safe harbor can be properly
determined. (16) The music industry believed that certain aspects of Napster's service functioned as locator
tools, and thus outside the scope of section 512(a) safe harbor, a provision intended to only protected service
providers. (17) These locator tools, such as a search engine, index, directory, and links, had to meet the more
stringent safe harbor requirements of section 512(d). (18)
{8}The music industry offered an alternative argument against the application of the section 512(a) safe
harbor provision to Napster's services. The plaintiffs stressed that section 512(a) was inapplicable because the
infringing material at issue was transmitted directly between users and never through Napster, thus
concluding that the defendant played an indirect role. (19)
{9}Finally, the music industry argued that Napster failed to comply with section 512(i) of the DMCA which
requires that a service provider adopt, implement, and inform users of its policy to terminate services for all
repeat copyright infringers. (20) The plaintiffs noted that although Napster's plan was in effect as early as
October 1999, it was not made known to users until February 7, 2000, after the onset of litigation. (21)
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that although Napster may have provided an infringement policy, there was
not an adequate plan of enforcement to ensure compliance. For these reasons, the music industry concluded
that Napster was not provided safe harbor under section 512(a). (22)
{10}In its analysis, the court looked first to the plaintiffs' claim that the section 512(a) safe harbor did not
apply to all of Napster's functions, but instead that section 512(n) was applicable. (23) Napster argued that
even if some aspects of its service could be classified as locator tools under section 512(n), these aspects were
not fundamental to its main function as a service provider. The court agreed with the plaintiffs contention that
some aspects of Napster's service were locator functions. (24) They found evidence for this contention in
Napster's own advertisements centering on Napster's ability to find and locate millions of songs. (25)
Therefore, the court held that section 512(a) did not provide safe harbor for all of Napster's functions. (26)
{11}Next the court turned its attention to the question of whether some of Napster's functions were in fact
protected under section 512(a). The plaintiffs argued that the copyrighted information did not pass directly
through Napster, therefore Napster should not receive protection. Napster argued that providing the
connections for its customers entitles it to safe harbor. The court reasoned that although Napster provided the
connections, these connections passed through the Internet and not through its own system as required under
section 512(a). The court concluded: "Because Napster does not transmit, route, or provide connections
through its system, it has failed to demonstrate that it qualifies for 512(a) safe harbor. The court thus declined
to grant summary adjudication in its favor. (27)
{12}On the final point addressed, Napster's copyright compliance policy, the court also ruled summary
adjudication inappropriate. The court indicated that Napster failed to demonstrate an adequate policy for
terminating repeat copyright infringers. (28) The court concluded that the plaintiff successfully presented
material issues of fact regarding Napster's operations and refused to grant summary adjudication.
B. The Music Industry's Prayer for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
{13}In August of this year, the music industry moved for a preliminary injunction in order to prevent Napster
from transmitting copyrighted music without express permission of the owner of the copyright. (29) Napster
argued that it was protected under an expanded version of the fair use doctrine established in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (30) Alternatively, Napster claimed that the plaintiffs failed to provide
evidence of probable success on their contributory and vicarious infringement claims. Finally, the defendant
argued that the services it provided did not injure copyright holders, but instead promoted the music industry
through increased exposure. (31)
{14}The court first explored the fair use doctrine, as set out in section 107 of the Copyright Act and explored
by the United States Supreme Court in Sony. (32) In Sony, the Supreme Court stated, "[a]ny individual may
reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use;' the copyright holder does not possess the exclusive right to such
a case." (33) The Napster court looked to the four factors outlined in Sony to determine whether the fair use
doctrine exonerated Napster from liability for copyright infringement.
{15}First, the court asked whether Napster's use of copyrighted materials was commercial in nature. (34)
Although the downloading of music files on the Internet was not a truly commercial use, it could not be
classified as personal either. The court held that due to the magnitude and anonymous nature of Napster's
clientele, the service could not be classified as personal. (35) Next, the court turned its attention to the nature
of the copyrighted work. They concluded that the material being traded was for entertainment purposes and
was creative in nature, thus reducing Napster's chances for protection under the fair use doctrine. The court
then looked to the amount of copyrighted material used, which was undisputed because the downloading of
MP3 files entails copying music in its entirety. Finally, the court explored Napster's impact on the potential
market value of the copyrighted music and found it diminished the music industry's sales. (36)
{16}The district court concluded that it was inappropriate to afford protection to Napster under the fair use
doctrine. (37) Napster then argued that it had several other uses, such as space-shifting, sampling, and
authorized distribution of new artists' work, that should be afforded protection. The court again declined
protection and noted that these additional uses were not fundamental to Napster's operations. (38)
{17}The court then proceeded to the issue of contributory copyright infringement. As a threshold matter, the
court noted that Napster's users were directly infringing on copyrighted materials. (39) In order for Napster to
be found contributorily liable, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that Napster had either actual or constructive
knowledge of the third party's direct infringement. The court concluded that the plaintiffs supported their
contention with enough evidence to allow for a finding of contributory copyright infringement. (40)
{18}Finally, the district court explored the issue of vicarious copyright infringement. In order to be found
vicariously liable, a defendant must supervise and have a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.
(41) The court stated that Napster did play a supervisory role because of its ability to police its users, if it
chose to do so. The court then looked to Napster's financial interest in the trading and transferring of the
copyrighted music and found that although the company currently generated no revenue, there was evidence
of plans to increase revenues by building the user base. (42) The defendant offered several defenses, all of
which the court found to be inadequate. These defenses included claims that the music industry was violating
Napster's First Amendment right to free speech, that the industry was restricting the distribution of new
artists' music, and that the plaintiffs waived their copyrights when they made music available in MP3 form
over the Internet. In a final attempt to persuade the court not to grant the plaintiff's preliminary injunction, the
defendant claimed that the hardship on their company would be unbearable. (43) In response to this
contention, the court stated: "Although even a narrow injunction may so fully eviscerate Napster, Inc. as to
destroy its user base or make its service technologically infeasible, the business interests of an infringer do
not trump a rights holder's entitlement to copyright protection." (44)
{19}The music industry was granted their injunction and it appeared that if Napster was going to be
temporarily out of business. As Napster users across the country frantically tried to download their favorite
music in the days proceeding the start of the scheduled shutdown, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stepped in and granted a stay. On October 2, 2000, this case went before a three-judge panel of
the circuit court for a hearing upon which the nation is still awaiting a decision. (45)
III. MP3.COM
{20}MP3.com was launched in January 2000, to provide users with a variety of CDs to download at their
convenience. (46) In order to make this service possible, MP3.com bought thousands of copyrighted CDs to
provide to their users free of charge. The users could then download the available music by either providing
proof of existing ownership, a process known as "Beam-It", or by agreeing to purchase the CD at issue, a
process known as "Instant Listening." (47) Proof of ownership was demonstrated by an individual placing his
copy of the CD in his computer's CD-Rom where it could then be verified by the server. (48)
A. The Recording Industry's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement
{21}In defense of the plaintiffs' motion, MP3.com claimed protection under the fair use doctrine of the
Copyright Act. (49) Similar to the exploration in Napster, the court looked to the four elements of the act.
First, the court concluded that the services provided by MP3.com were commercial because the defendant
could make a profit through an expanding client base. (50) Next, the court found the copyrighted material at
issue was clearly creative in nature, thus further decreasing the defendant's hopes of protection under the fair
use doctrine. The court then explored whether a substantial portion of the copyrighted material at issue was
provided to users and concluded that it was. The CDs in their entirety were being copied, therefore the
defendant could not receive fair use protection in regard to them. Finally, the court found that the defendant
failed to present an influential argument concerning any potential positive effect its products made on the
music market, and the court concluded that the fair use doctrine did not grant protection. (51)
{22}The defendant attempted to argue that it provided a service to the music industry by providing
consumers with CDs that would otherwise be pirated. In response to this claim, the court stated: "Stripped of
its essence, defendant's 'consumer protection' argument amounts to nothing more than a bald claim that
defendant should be able to misappropriate plaintiff's property simply because there is a consumer demand
for it. This hardly appeals to the conscience of equity." (52) Additionally, MP3.com brought various other
defenses before the court, including copyright abuse, estoppel, unclean hands, and abandonment, all of which
were quickly dismissed. (53) In conclusion, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgement and held that the defendants committed copyright infringement.
B. The District Court Calculates Damages
{23}The district court reviewed the history and evidence surrounding MP3.com in order to calculate damages
for copyright infringement. (54) The court concluded that the defendant willingly and consciously provided
copyrighted music to its users. Additionally, the defendant's infringing actions were potentially harmful to the
plaintiffs and to music industry sales. Although the defendant was clearly in violation of the Copyright Act,
the court looked to mitigating circumstances before imposing damages. For example, the court considered the
defendant's good behavior since the court's initial ruling in May. (55) In the end, the court concluded that the
assigned damages must send a message to similar Internet companies engaged in providing copyrighted
materials. In furtherance of this reasoning, the court stated:
Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some companies operating in the area of
the Internet may have the misconception that, because their technology is somewhat novel, they
are somehow immune from the ordinary applications of laws of the United States including
copyright law. They need to understand that the law's domain knows no such limits. (56)
The court concluded that damages of $25,000 per CD on approximately 4,700 CDs would send an adequate
warning to others. (57)
IV. IMPACT ON RIAA V. DIAMOND MULTIMEDIA
{24}The recent developments in the dispute between the music industry and MP3-based services do not
appear to affect greatly the ruling set out by the appeals court in RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia. The
fundamental difference between Diamond and the more recent MP3.com and Napster cases is that the Rio
player being offered by Diamond was a piece of equipment capable of clearly legal uses, not merely a
facilitator for copyright infringement. (58)
{25}Although Napster attempted to draw a close connection to Diamond's space-shifting and fair use
doctrine arguments, the federal district court declined to accept their reasoning and felt that these defenses
were inapplicable to Napster's services. (59) In its recent hearing before the circuit court, Napster once again
claimed that legal uses outweighed any potential illegal uses of the service. (60) In addition to trying to align
itself with Diamond's successful argument, Napster is attempting to distance itself from MP3.com, by
claiming that they lacked commercial intent and that they never made copies of copyrighted music, but
merely provided a forum for exchange. (61)
{26}Napster takes the position that they are simply providing a community sharing system for music lovers
and although there are millions of users, the purpose of the service is non-commercial. (62) Counsel for
RIAA finds this proposition ludicrous and questions how a company that serves as a facilitator for the transfer
of copyrighted music to millions could classify its purpose as personal in nature. (63)
V. IS THERE A VIABLE SOLUTION?
{27}Some believe that the changes taking place in the music industry should be embraced, not suppressed,
and that copyright laws have outlived their usefulness. (64) Advocates of Internet music providers, such as
Napster and MP3.com, feel that these services will benefit artists and bring democracy to an industry
traditionally dominated by few. (65) Supporters of the recording industry view these services as criminal
organizations created to facilitate the theft of copyrighted materials. (66) Additionally, they feel that free
trading of copyrighted music on the Internet could destroy the industry by eliminating profits. (67) The
government has cast its vote in favor of the recording industry. Lawyers for the U.S. Copyright Office
recently expressed support for the district court's ruling in Napster. (68)
{28}The recording industry must utilize technology if it is going to continue to protect artists' work through
the current copyright system. Technology will continue to evolve and soon untraceable software will become
commonplace. (69) Copyright laws, however sophisticated, will be useless against undetectable violations.
One potential answer is the use of digital watermarks and encryption technologies to prevent infringement.
(70) Another option is the creation of programs for tracking pirated music on the Internet. (71)
{29}The only viable long-term solution is to combat technology with technology. Not only music, but all
forms of electronic media, including movies and books, must be protected from copyright infringement. (72)
Simply because the infringement is taking place in new and somewhat uncharted territory does not justify
violating established fundamental principals of American copyright law. Perhaps the presiding judge in the
UMG Recordings, Inc., et. al. v. MP3.com, Inc., said it best: "Defendant's copyright infringement was clear,
and the mere fact that it was clothed in the exotic webbing of the Internet does not disguise its illegality." (73)
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